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An “SDVCJ Fix”—Paths Forward in Tribal
Domestic Violence Jurisdiction
JOSHUA B. GURNEY†
Domestic violence has riddled the indigenous communities of the United States for decades.
Within this problem lies another—non-Indians perpetrate crimes of domestic violence against
Indian women at disproportionately high rates. Exacerbating this issue is the complicated web of
criminal jurisdiction split between federal, state, and tribal governments. To ostensibly solve the
problem, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013. The Act
contained an important provision that returned criminal jurisdiction to tribes, called “Special
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction.”
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction, by most accounts, has been a resounding
success. But it suffers from critical limitations, namely, requirements that make its implementation
impossible for most tribes. This Note proposes a solution to these limitations that would allow all
tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence: an SDVCJ fix. By
examining Supreme Court precedent and applying a more consistent constitutional analysis, this
Note advances a theory by which tribes could prosecute non-Indian defendants notwithstanding
the inability to provide all facets of due process.

† Senior Articles Editor, Hastings Law Journal, Volume 70; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law. I would like to thank Professors D. Kelly Weisberg and Zachary Price
for their invaluable input in the development of this Note. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dean S. James Anaya
for his thorough commentary and suggestions. Last, I’d like to thank the Journal editors and staff for shepherding
this paper through many necessary rounds of edits. None of this would be possible without the love and support
of friends and family who have sustained me throughout this process. All mistakes are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Few stories in American history are as appalling as our government’s
protracted mistreatment of the indigenous peoples of the United States. By way
of “manifest destiny,” subjugation, and centuries of progressive erosion of tribal
sovereignty at the hands of our government and its highest court, our country’s
collective ambition has left in its wake a trail of hardship and pain.1 Today, the
scores of tribal nations scattered across our country face some of the most
challenging economic and educational conditions in America.2 It was in this
environment that domestic violence began—and still continues—to proliferate
in native communities.3 To make matters worse, the very laws of the United
States encouraged, rather than hindered, the perpetration of domestic violence

1. See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Report on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47, at 10–13 (July 6, 2012); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 585 (1823) (holding the “exclusive power to extinguish” the “Indian right of occupancy” resided in the U.S.
government).
2. Jens Manuel Krogstad, One-in-Four Native American and Alaska Natives Are Living in Poverty, PEW
RES. CTR. (June 13, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/13/1-in-4-native-americans-andalaska-natives-are-living-in-poverty.
3. See Anaya, supra note 1, at 10–11.
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against native women by non-Indian men.4 For nearly forty years, tribes were
completely unable to hold criminally accountable any non-Indian offenders who
committed acts of domestic violence against Indian people, owing to our own
Supreme Court.5
Fortunately, the status quo did not go unchallenged. By the beginning of
this past decade, a chorus of outrage from tribal leaders and victims of domestic
violence finally convinced Congress to take action.6 On March 7, 2013,
Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013
(VAWA 2013) giving hope to tribes which, for so long, had been unable to
adequately protect their people against domestic violence.7 This Act contained
a unique provision, called “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction”
(SDVCJ), which recognized the inherent power of a tribe to exercise criminal
authority over all people who commit crimes of domestic violence against their
people and on their lands.8 Now set to expire, a new VAWA is once again
moving towards reauthorization in Congress.9 Soon SDVCJ may be a thing of
the past, substituted for a retooled “special tribal criminal jurisdiction,” with new
attendant powers (discussed in more depth infra Part II).10
This Note identifies some of the critical weaknesses of VAWA 2013—
weaknesses not corrected in current reauthorization bills—and proposes a novel,
constitutionally acceptable expansion of tribal jurisdiction over non-native
perpetrators of domestic violence. It argues for new expansions of VAWA and
the Indian Civil Rights Act that allow all tribes to criminally prosecute and
imprison non-Indian defendants who commit crimes of domestic violence
against tribal members, have sufficient ties to the victim, and do not successfully
complete tribal programs initially offered to the defendant as an alternative to
incarceration. This Note proposes that making this expansion available to all
tribes, or most tribes, is necessary, even though many tribes will not be able to
offer non-Indian defendants due process completely consistent with the Indian
Civil Rights Act and the United States Constitution.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discussed infra Part I).
6. See Sari Horwitz, Arizona Tribe Set to Prosecute First Non-Indian Under a New Law, WASH. POST
(Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/arizona-tribe-set-to-prosecute-first-non-indianunder-a-new-law/2014/04/18/127a202a-bf20-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html?utm_term=.1f4dea3c7942.
7. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54.
8. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 2013).
9. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act 2018, H.R. 6545, 115th Cong. (2018); Sarah D. Wire,
Landmark Violence Against Women Act May Expire While Congress Tends to Other Business, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
13, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-violence-against-women-expire-20180913story.html; cf. Rebecca Nagle, What the Violence Against Women Act Could Do in Indian Country—and One
Major Flaw, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-what-theviolence-against-women-act-could-do-in-indian-country-and-one-major-flaw (“If VAWA lapses, it will not
change any statutes in the existing law or even necessarily cut funding. During the last reauthorization fight, for
example, VAWA expired for 500 days, and yet program funding continued. But whether or not the bill is
reauthorized, it still must go through the appropriations process, in which Congress allocates the necessary
money.”).
10. See H.R. 6545 § 906.
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This Note seeks to strike a balance between the ideal and the feasible,
especially given the potential for decades of a conservative majority on the
Supreme Court that could ultimately decide the constitutionality of a retooled
VAWA.11 Issues of tribal sovereignty and self-determination will always
underlie the relationships between tribal and state and federal governments.12
This Note recognizes the importance of those issues but focuses primarily on the
problem unique to the context of SDVCJ—the unacceptably high rates of
domestic violence. This Note’s thesis thus focuses on how the laws of the United
States can best serve tribal victims13 of domestic violence, perpetrated by nonnatives on Indian lands.
The Introduction and Part I provide contextual information about domestic
violence generally, the prevalence of domestic violence in Indian country, and
the historical development of criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands, all of which
set the stage prior to the enactment of VAWA 2013. Part II reviews the
implementation of SDVCJ and discusses current developments and criticisms.
Finally, Part III offers a path forward by arguing for a constitutionally consistent
expansion of SDVCJ based on Supreme Court precedent and the dire need to
address the situation in Indian country.
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
According to André B. Rosay’s National Intimate Partner and Sexual
Violence Survey, nearly forty percent of American Indian and Alaska Native
women reported experiencing at least one form of domestic violence in 2015.14
Native women are among the most susceptible to violence of any ethnic group

11. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Conservatives in Charge, the Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017-termmoved-right.html. However, the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch—who previously served on the Tenth
Circuit—brings the Supreme Court significant federal Indian law experience and perhaps a fresh perspective.
See John Dossett, Justice Gorsuch and Federal Indian Law, 43 HUM. RTS. 7, 8 (2017) (“Justice Gorsuch has
significantly more experience with Indian law cases than other recent Supreme Court nominees. His opinions
have commonly recognized tribes as sovereign governments and have addressed issues such as state police
incursion onto tribal lands, sovereign immunity, religious freedom, accounting for trust funds, exhaustion of
tribal remedies, and Indian Country criminal jurisdiction.”).
12. For a discussion of the implications of SDVCJ on tribal sovereignty, see generally Angela R. Riley,
Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564 (2016); Catherine M. Redlingshafer, Note,
An Avoidable Conundrum: How American Indian Legislation Unnecessarily Forces Tribal Governments to
Choose Between Cultural Preservation and Women’s Vindication, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (2017).
13. This Note will use the phrases “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably.
14. ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN 2 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249822.pdf
(interpreting data from the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NIPSVS), a report launched
by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and partially funded by the National Institute of Justice).
NIPSVS respondents were from a nationally representative sample of over 4,000 adults who identified
themselves as either American Indian or Alaska Native. The female respondents reported violence in 2015 in
the following categories: 14.4% experienced sexual violence, 8.6% experienced physical violence by an intimate
partner, 11.6% experienced stalking, and 25.5% experienced psychological aggression by an intimate partner.
Id.
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in the United States.15 In the year studied, Rosay found American Indian and
Alaska Native women were 1.7 times more likely to experience violence
compared to white women.16 Of all American Indian and Alaska Native survey
respondents who reported experiencing violence in their lifetime, ninety-seven
percent had experienced violence by a non-Indian, non-native person.17
As astounding as these numbers are, statistics alone likely do not tell the
whole story. Domestic violence is typically under-reported. “For many reasons
that include the stigma often attached to intimate partner violence, the fear of
retaliation from their perpetrators, and numerous other safety concerns,
estimating incidence rates of this violence has always been a difficult task.”18
Available statistics are unclear on whether reported rates of victimization are
increasing or decreasing on Indian lands.19 Nevertheless, the present
victimization rate—nearly one in seven—remain unacceptably high.
An examination of the nature of domestic violence is helpful in trying to
grasp the magnitude of the problem of domestic violence in Indian country.
Domestic violence, and more specifically intimate partner violence, are much
broader phenomena, with more derivative behaviors, than the terms suggest. As
one might expect, domestic violence manifests through acts of physical abuse
such as battering and strangulation, but also through less obvious forms of harm
such as financial abuse, psychological abuse, and stalking.20 At its core,
domestic violence is a pattern of behavior in which an abuser attempts to exert
control over his victim.21 Dr. Lenore Walker, a key psychological theorist in the
field of domestic violence, has described and illuminated tactics used by abusers
in carrying out this control:
[B]atterers consciously isolate women from others; women also withdraw from
society to protect others from harm and themselves from embarrassment. Three
times as many battered women as nonbattered women are isolated financially
because they have “no access to cash.” And twenty-two percent of women in
abusive relationships (versus only thirteen percent in nonabusive relationships)
have no access to a car. Regarding other controlling behaviors . . . whereas
battered women were not permitted to go places three-quarters of the time,

15. See id. (comparing the domestic violence rates of Natives to those experienced by non-Hispanic
whites); see also STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN
INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002, at iii–v (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/aic.pdf (comparing rates of violent victimizations experienced by Natives to those of other U.S. racial
or ethnic groups).
16. Rosay, supra note 14, at 2.
17. Id. at 4. The NIPSVS does not specify a percentage of survey respondents who were victims of
domestic violence by non-Indians in 2015. See id.
18. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 27 (2008).
19. Compare id. at 47 (“American Indian and Alaska Native women have the highest rate of victimization
(18.2) . . . .”), with ROSAY, supra note 14, at 2 (finding 14.4% have experienced sexual violence and 8.6%
experienced physical violence in the year prior to the study).
20. See Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic
Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1116–18 (2009).
21. Id.

70.4-GURNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

892

4/2/2019 1:19 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:887

nonbattered women were not permitted to go places only one-quarter of the time.
Also, batterers, unlike nonabusive partners, knew where their victims were at
almost all times.22

These are just a few of the many behaviors used by batterers to isolate and abuse
their partners.
In the specific context of violence against women in Indian country, other
unique concerns also play a role. Colonization and historical trauma experienced
by Indian communities also played a role in making Indian women uniquely
vulnerable to domestic violence.23
[Federal policies of] [r]emoval, relocation, and assimilate[on] resulted in loss of
traditional homelands and lifestyles, creation of dependency on the federal
government, loss of identity and traditional cultural knowledge, the placement of
Native women at greater risk for violence, disruption in family life and parenting,
and loss of familiar and communal support systems. 24

This background leaves Native women in a position unique among any
victimized group.25 As discussed in more depth in infra Parts I and II, several
problems relate to and exacerbate the epidemic facing women in Indian country
such as insufficient funding, unclear jurisdiction for law enforcement, and
victims’ lack of trust in federal law enforcement.26
Sometimes overlooked in the academic discussion of SDVCJ are the
lasting negative consequences that the inability to hold batterers accountable has
on victims in tribal communities. When perpetrators of domestic violence are
enabled to continue their abuses, victims suffer. While this is the exact problem
that SDVCJ sought to fix, again, for so many tribes it is simply not possible to
implement the measures required to use it, and as a result, victims continue to
suffer.27 An ineffective criminal justice system effectively silences victims, who
are discouraged from reporting abuses for fear of retaliation, and emboldens
offenders, thereby perpetuating a cycle of violence in tribal lands.28
Additionally, the collateral consequences of domestic violence on Indian
lands are another cause for alarm. One of the leading causes of homelessness
among women is domestic violence.29 American Indian and Alaskan Native
22. Id. at 1119 (footnotes omitted); see also LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
7 (4th ed. 2017) (“Men continue to use physical, sexual, and psychological abuse to obtain and maintain power
and control over women and children, because they can.”).
23. Roe Bubar & Pamela Jumper Thurman, Violence Against Native Women, 31 SOC. JUST. 70, 73 (2004).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 73–75.
26. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 9.
27. See Lorelei Laird, Indian Tribes Are Retaking Jurisdiction over Domestic Violence on Their Own Land,
A.B.A. J. (Apr. 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/indian_tribes_are_retaking_jurisdiction_
over_domestic_violence_on_their_own.
28. See NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 4 (2018) [hereinafter FIVE-YEAR REPORT] (discussing how the rulings that
tribes did not have jurisdiction over non-Indians perpetuated victims living in fear because of the lack of
accountability by abusers).
29. See Rose Quilt et al., Domestic Violence and Housing Across Tribal Nations, Alaska Native Villages
and Indian Communities, NAT’L INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RESOURCE CTR. (Dec. 14, 2017),
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women face homelessness at five times the national level.30 Making matters
worse, out of the 573 federally recognized tribes, there are only sixty tribal
domestic violence shelters.31 These problems underlie the thesis advanced in this
Note.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON TRIBAL JURISDICTION
As described by Professor Angela R. Riley,32 “[t]he criminal justice crisis
that exists in Indian country today is a manifestation of a failure of law so
extreme that it has actually caused reservation crime to flourish.”33 Indeed, the
current struggle on Indian lands is a product of federal government
policymaking that has steered American Indian affairs throughout U.S. history.34
Historically, federal policy has been guided by two overarching, competing
principles: the first respects the distinctness of Indian people and recognizing
tribal sovereignty; and the second focuses on a steady assimilation of Indians
into non-Indian society.35 The tension between these two views provides a
backstop for the jurisdictional conflict created by federal policy, and was only
partially resolved by the SDVCJ provision in VAWA 2013. While an exhaustive
look into the history of federal-Indian relations is outside the scope of this Note,
a brief overview provides context.36

http://www.niwrc.org/resources/domestic-violence-and-housing-across-tribal-nations-alaska-native-villagesand-indian (noting that collateral crimes such as assaults on arresting police officers are not covered by VAWA).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Angela R. Riley is a Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law and the Director of UCLA’s Native
Nations Law and Policy Center.
33. Riley, supra note 12, at 1574.
34. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1,
2015).
35. See id.; WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 13 (6th ed. 2015) (“At some
times, the prevailing view has regarded the tribes as enduring bodies for which a geographical base would have
to be established and more or less protected. At other times, the dominant position has been that the tribes are or
should be in the process of decline and disappearance, and that their members should be absorbed into the mass
of non-Indian society.”).
36. For a comprehensive historical summary of federal-Indian relations, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
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A. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS & THE “JURISDICTIONAL
MAZE”37 OF FEDERAL, INDIAN, & STATE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The United States Constitution addresses interactions between the Indian
tribes and the United States in the so-called Indian Commerce Clause,38 and in
the treaty power outlined in Article II, Section II.39 In a trilogy of early Indian
law cases decided and authored by then-Chief Justice Marshall,40 the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted the federal government’s constitutional powers and
established that the federal government had exclusive authority over affairs with
Native Americans, superseding both individual citizens’ and states’ influence.41
The Marshall Court articulated tribes’ status as that of “domestic dependent
nations,” embodying simultaneous characteristics of sovereigns and “wards” of
the federal government.42 When it comes to tribal criminal jurisdiction, a central
theme has been the steady erosion of tribal sovereignty at the hands of the federal
power outlined in the Marshall Trilogy and expanded throughout the twentieth
century.43
The earliest days of interaction between tribes and the United States were
vastly different from today. Professor Catherine Struve44 provides a useful
synopsis of this early history of Indian sovereignty:
Prior to European contact, Indian tribes exercised full sovereign authority;
after contact, the European powers dealt with the tribes by means of treaties. The
young United States continued the practice of treating tribes as sovereigns,
negotiating and entering into treaties with them until 1871. In substance, the
federal and state governments’ treatment of Indian nations sometimes ranged
from the unfair to the genocidal. During the early nineteenth century, for
37. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976) (“This Article, by providing the historical context from which
this labyrinth emerged, hopefully provides an historical guide through the jurisdictional maze that presently
exists.” (emphasis added)). For a useful graphic comparison of criminal jurisdiction in Indian lands, see JUSTIN
B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 71–72, 185 (3d ed. 2016).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power to] regulate Commerce . . . with the
Indian Tribes.”).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) (“The constitutional text addresses two means by which Indian tribes
and the United States interact.”); Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal
Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 670 (2013) (“The sparse guidance the Constitution itself provides on the
status of America’s native peoples seems to place Indian tribes in an intermediate category between foreign and
domestic states.”).
40. The “Marshall Trilogy” of cases (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)) were a series of
Supreme Court opinions that framed the boundaries of tribal-state-federal relations as they would come to be
interpreted by the Supreme Court. For a well-framed overview, see Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and
Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 140–42 (2004).
41. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
For further discussion into the drafting and constitutional interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause, see
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 57–63 (2009).
42. Price, supra note 39, at 670.
43. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 41, at 59–63; Riley, supra note 12, at 1579.
44. Catherine Struve is a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where she
teaches and researches in the fields of civil procedure and federal courts.
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example, non-Indians used pressure tactics and violence in their efforts to obtain
tribal lands, and the federal government ultimately pressed on the southeastern
tribes the policy of “removal” from the tribes’ homelands to lands west of the
Mississippi. It was a brutal policy; when the last Cherokees east of the Mississippi
moved west along the Trail of Tears, the conditions before, during and after the
journey were so harsh that some 4,000 of them died. In form, however, the federal
government treated the tribes as sovereign entities. Thus, for example, the
removal of the southeastern tribes occurred pursuant to “treaties” purportedly
entered into by those tribes.45

Tribes would continue to suffer this drain of their original status at the
hands of the federal government, whether by force or court decision.46 This, of
course, underlies the frustration felt by Native American advocates in the
domestic violence realm.
Sovereignty has a direct corollary to authority over criminal activity. When
it comes to criminal authority, a tribe’s power to govern and employ jurisdiction
over crimes committed within its territory is a direct product of its sovereignty.47
As the prevailing doctrine of federal law holds, such power can only be
diminished when a tribe voluntarily cedes it, or when Congress acts
affirmatively to take that power away through its authority based in the Marshall
Trilogy.48 This core doctrine, coupled with the concept of “implicit divestiture,”
conflicts directly with the sovereignty tribes rightfully have and never properly
relinquished.49
Of course, this Note would not have a purpose were it not for the present
problems in tribal criminal jurisdiction. A complicated web of history and law
laid the groundwork for these issues. The earliest symptoms of our current
jurisdictional issues started benignly enough—by the late 1700s, certain treaties
between tribes and the federal government allowed for shared criminal
jurisdiction over certain interracial crimes.50 But two major federal laws enacted
in the 1800s created a far different jurisdictional landscape in Indian country,
namely, the General Crimes Act of 181751 and the Major Crimes Act of 1885.52
While the General Crimes Act extended federal criminal laws to apply in Indian
country, it specifically did not apply to internal crimes between Indians.53 Going
a step further, the Major Crimes Act removed tribes’ jurisdiction entirely from
serious crimes like murder and kidnapping, regardless of whether the perpetrator
45. Struve, supra note 40, at 138–40 (footnotes omitted).
46. See id. at 139–43.
47. See Jacqueline P. Hand & David C. Koelsch, Shared Experiences, Divergent Outcomes: American
Indian and Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 185, 196 (2010); Riley,
supra note 12, at 1576–77.
48. Hand & Koelsch, supra note 47, at 196. For further discussion, see infra Part II.
49. See discussion of Oliphant, infra text accompanying note 65.
50. Riley, supra note 12, at 1577. For an expansive analysis of tribal jurisdiction during the treaty period,
see Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17
ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 953–58 (1975).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
52. See id. § 1153.
53. Riley, supra note 12, at 1577.
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and/or victim were Indian.54 This latter statute grew directly in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, which held federal courts
lacked jurisdiction to try a member of the Brule Sioux tribe for the murder of a
Brule Sioux Chief.55
The most significant complications in criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands
took place in the past century. Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 1953, which
transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to certain states, giving those states
jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated in the Indian country located within the
states’ borders.56 In Public Law 280, Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin (the “mandatory states”), assumed partial federal
criminal jurisdiction over the Indian country within their state boundaries.57 The
resulting system was a complicated web of concurrent and exclusive
jurisdictions between the tribal, state, and federal governments that differed
based on location, crime, offender, and victim.58 Public Law 280 was essentially
a post-war federal budget reduction policy.59 Consequently, tribes falling in
Public Law 280 jurisdictions found themselves in the midst of a criminal justice
system with confused boundaries and essentially no guaranteed funding.60 And
since states typically had little interest in devoting resources to Indian country
law enforcement, tribes in Public Law 280 states quickly found themselves in a
vacuum of adequate policing and supporting judicial infrastructure.61 The Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 further defined the nature of Indian justice proceedings,
setting forth the rights Indian governments must guarantee to individual Indians
and limiting the penal authority of tribal courts beyond imposing a $5,000 fine
or one year of imprisonment.62
The discussion so far has largely brushed over exactly what criminal
authority was exercised by tribes before Western interference. In fact, the classic
Western adversarial criminal justice model “was imposed onto tribes in the

54. Hand & Koelsch, supra note 47, at 196.
55. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883); see also Clinton, supra note 50, at 963. The Sioux tribal council found Crow
Dog responsible for the murder of a tribal chief, and under an application of traditional Brule Sioux law, Crow
Dog was ordered to pay restitution to the victim’s family. Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in
the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 198–99 (1998).
56. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2012)). Public Law 280 specifically exempted certain tribes, and thus does not apply to all situations within
certain states subjected to Public Law 280 jurisdiction. See id.
57. Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1998).
58. DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW
280, at 6–9 (2012).
59. Id. at 13.
60. See id.
61. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1417–18 (1997).
62. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–04 (2012)); see also Riley, supra note 12, at 1581. The Act originally provided for lower punishment
authority, but it was amended in 1986 to raise penal limits to a $5,000 fine and one year of imprisonment. Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 202(B).
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nineteenth century, specifically to disrupt and destroy tribal cultures, Indian
justice systems, and traditional dispute resolution practices.”63 Before this
meddling, many tribes practiced local, restorative justice, which bore little
resemblance to the proceedings often required today.64 Some of these practices
will play a key role in the discussion infra Parts II and III.
Arguably the most significant development in tribal criminal jurisdiction,
however, was the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, which held that Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.65 The Court based its holding in large part on the theory that tribes
“submit[ted] to the overriding sovereignty of the United States,” thereby
forfeiting the power they may have had earlier.66 This “implicit divestiture”
doctrine, as it later came to be known, formed the foundation for a new and
controversial principle that shaped decades of the Court’s federal Indian law
jurisprudence.67 The fallout from Oliphant left tribes powerless and completely
reliant on the federal government (or state governments in Public Law 280
states) to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians on Indian
lands.68 Geographic isolation and mistrust made federal law enforcement and
prosecutors uniquely ill-suited to enforce criminal laws—particularly those as
personal and localized as domestic violence laws—on tribal lands as crime and
violence flourished over the ensuing years.69 Federal policy languished at this
nadir of injustice for nearly forty years.
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2010 &
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013
Major change in Federal Indian policy eluded tribal leaders and survivors
of domestic violence for decades.70 Finally, by the mid-2000s, recognition of the
problem on Native lands began to move into the national spotlight.71 A
“convergence of media coverage, targeted advocacy, coalition building, and
lobbying” would be the foundation upon which Congress enacted two laws
signaling a marked change: the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) and,
soon after it, VAWA 2013.72

63. Riley, supra note 12, at 1579 (footnotes omitted).
64. See id. at 1579, 1620.
65. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
66. Id. at 210; see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 41, at 219 (discussing the Oliphant decision).
67. Lance F. Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power, 42 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 69, 82–89
(2017).
68. See Hand & Koelsch, supra note 47, at 197.
69. Id. at 197–98; Riley, supra note 12, at 1582–83.
70. Riley, supra note 12, at 1584.
71. SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NATIVE
AMERICA 99 (2015).
72. Riley, supra note 12, at 1584–85.
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The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010

TLOA was based on several key findings, among them that the complex
criminal jurisdiction scheme in Indian country has had a significant adverse
effect on public safety in Indian communities.73 TLOA contains three key
provisions. First, TLOA grants enhanced sentencing authority to tribes
(amending the Indian Civil Rights Act), which allows tribes to sentence criminal
defendants to up to three years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.74 But the
enhanced penal authority under TLOA is only available to tribal courts that
ensure certain procedural safeguards,75 and may only be exercised over specific
crimes.76 TLOA did nothing to expand the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts,
leaving in place the framework of Oliphant. Second, TLOA contains a
transparency measure that requires the federal government to compile and report
crimes that occur in Indian country that federal prosecutors decline to
prosecute.77 The third key provision was the creation and funding of the Indian
Law and Order Commission, tasked with conducting a “comprehensive study of
law enforcement and criminal justice in tribal communities.”78 The Indian Law
and Order Commission’s charter resulted in the 2013 publication A Roadmap
for Making Native America Safer, which advocated for tribe-centric solutions
and greater cooperation from federal and state law enforcement agencies.79
2.

The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013

Shortly after the passage of TLOA, another radical shift in federal Indian
policy occurred in response to the epidemic of domestic violence in Indian
country. In the wake of Oliphant, stories emerged of non-Indian batterers
emboldened to victimize their Indian partners because of the immunity they
enjoyed on Indian lands.80 The story of survivors like Diane Millich, a native of
the Southern Ute Tribe in southern Colorado, sent chills all the way to Congress:
At age twenty-six Millich married a white man, and the couple moved to her
home on the Southern Ute reservation in Colorado. Shortly after they were

73. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2279 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)).
74. Id.
75. Among the requirements, the tribal court must: (1) provide equivalent effective assistance of counsel,
(2) provide a judge licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction, and (3) make records publically available. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. §§ 211–12. For the most recent TLOA report as of this Note’s publication, see U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, INDIAN COUNTRY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 3, 29–30 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/
tribal/page/file/1113091/download (reporting 891 declined prosecutions in calendar year 2017, 37% of the
DOJ’s Indian country caseload). The DOJ maintains that “[d]eclinations alone do not provide an accurate
accounting of the [United States Attorney’s Offices’] handling of Indian country criminal cases.” Id. at 38.
78. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 § 235, 124 Stat. at 2282, 2283 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302).
79. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT & CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES vii (2013), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/
A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf [hereinafter ROADMAP].
80. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 37, at 188.
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married, he began beating her. During repeated bouts of violence, Millich called
tribal police and county sheriffs, but to no avail. Because her husband was nonIndian, the Southern Ute Tribal Police had no jurisdiction over him; because she
was a Native American on tribal land, the La Plata County sheriff deputies had
no jurisdiction either. In this “jurisdictional black hole” only federal law
enforcement officials could prosecute the perpetrator, and Millich’s pleas for help
went nowhere. Millich has recounted that, “[a]fter one beating, my ex-husband
called the tribal police and the sheriff’s department himself, just to show me that
no one could stop him.” Eventually, he stormed into her workplace with a gun
and shot her coworker, who took a bullet to the shoulder to save her life. The
perpetrator was only arrested after investigators “use[d] a tape measure to sort
out jurisdiction, gauging the distance between the barrel of the gun and the point
of bullet impact to persuade the local police to intervene.”81

Stories like these were all too common in the post-Oliphant world.
Along with tribal advocates and others, Congress responded with a
groundbreaking piece of legislation in VAWA 2013, which sweepingly declared
“the powers of self-government of a participating tribe include the inherent
power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”82 This SDVCJ
provision, or “partial-Oliphant fix” as commentators referred to it, mended part
of the hole left by Oliphant by restoring tribal jurisdiction over crimes of
domestic violence committed by non-Indians on tribal lands.83 VAWA 2013 also
provided tribal courts “full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection
orders involving any person,” allowing tribes to enforce civil protection orders
consistent with federal law and due process.84
Tribal use of the SDVCJ provisions, however, is limited in several respects.
The crime itself must be “domestic violence or dating violence that occurs in the
Indian country of the participating tribe,” or a violation of a protection order
issued against the non-Indian defendant that is enforceable by the Indian tribe.85
Additionally, a tribe can only exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants
81. Riley, supra note 12, at 1590–91 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Jonathan
Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/politics/violence-against-women-act-held-up-by-tribal-land
issue.html; then quoting Laird, supra note 27; and then quoting Weisman, supra).
82. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 2013)).
83. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 37, at 188; Riley, supra note 12, at 1591.
84. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 905, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2265(e) (Supp. I 2013)).
85. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1). The Act defines “domestic violence” as
violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated
with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the
victim under the domestic—or family—violence laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the
Indian country where the violence occurs.
Id. § 1304(a)(2). The Act defines “dating violence” as “violence committed by a person who is or has been in a
social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, as determined by the length of the
relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the
relationship.” Id. § 1304(a)(1).
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with sufficient “ties to the Indian tribe,” defined as a defendant who: (1) resides
in the territory of the Indian tribe; (2) is employed by the Indian tribe; or (3) is a
“spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner” of a member or resident of a
participating Indian tribe.86
As with TLOA, a tribe may only exercise SDVCJ if the tribe provides
heightened procedural protections to defendants—protections the tribe would
not otherwise be required to provide to Indian defendants.87 If the tribe seeks to
punish by any term of imprisonment, all procedural requirements of TLOA must
be satisfied, including providing the defendant effective assistance of counsel,
using a presiding judge licensed to practice law, and making records of the
proceeding publically available.88 In addition to the TLOA requirements, tribes
exercising SDVCJ must provide defendants a right to jury trial representing a
“cross section of the community” that does not specifically exclude any group
of people.89 Defendants must also be notified of all their procedural rights,
including the right to stay their detention by the tribe after filing a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court.90 If a tribe cannot provide or fails to provide the requisite
protections to a non-Indian defendant, the tribe has no power under the law to
convict that defendant.91
Finally, VAWA 2013 authorized $5 million to be appropriated each fiscal
year from 2014 through 2018 to aid tribes in their exercise of SDVCJ and to
assist tribal victims of domestic violence.92 This generally recognizes the
extraordinary costs that coincide with implementing an often entirely new
justice system that is compatible with SDVCJ. As Professor Riley notes, VAWA
2013’s funding provisions also act to support and recognize tribes’ inherent
rights to exercise, where appropriate, their own “culturally suitable” alternatives
to incarceration.93 However, the funding authorized in VAWA 2013 has fallen
short of expectations in several respects.94

86. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
87. See generally id. § 1302 (discussing constitutional restraints).
88. Id. § 1304(d) (incorporating by reference sections of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010).
89. Id.
90. Id § 1304(e)(2). For further discussion of the implications of the habeas relief available under SDVCJ
prosecutions, see generally Hunter Cox, ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief: A New Habeas Jurisprudence for the PostOliphant World?, 5 AM. INDIAN L.J. 596 (2017).
91. Another VAWA 2013 provision requires a tribe exercising SDVCJ to provide “all other rights whose
protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm
the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the
defendant.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4). Congress debated this provision but declined to clarify it prior to passage
of the Act. Riley, supra note 12, at 1594 n.151 (“Although there was some discussion and debate about this
provision of the statute, its scope and content was not clarified prior to the pass of the Act.”).
92. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(h).
93. Id. § 1304(f)(1)(G) (including as an option for strengthening tribal criminal justice systems “culturally
appropriate services and assistance for victims and their families”); Riley, supra note 12, at 1592.
94. See infra Part II.
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II. WHERE WE ARE TODAY
This Part discusses the early effect SDVCJ has had on tribal nations,
relying largely on the 2018 National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)95
report on the five-year effects of VAWA 2013. This Part closes with an
examination of contemporary criticisms and the constitutional arguments for and
against tribal exercise of SDVCJ.
A. EARLY EFFECTS & THE NCAI FIVE-YEAR REPORT
Although VAWA 2013 was signed into law on March 7, 2013, the SDVCJ
provisions had a two-year delaying feature, preventing any tribe from exercising
SDVCJ for the Act’s first two years unless the tribe was accepted to participate
in the “pilot project” administered by the United States Department of Justice.96
Three tribes participated in the pilot long enough to provide data to a report
organized by the National Congress of American Indians to study early effects
and give recommendations.97 The three tribes, the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR) in Oregon, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in
Arizona, and the Tulalip Tribes of Washington, were approved to implement
SDVCJ in February 2014 and all had cases during the pilot program window.98
In the year spanning February 20, 2014 through March 6, 2015, “the three
original pilot tribes had a total of 27 SDVCJ cases involving 23 separate
offenders. Of the 27 cases, 11 were ultimately dismissed for jurisdictional or
investigative reasons, 10 resulted in guilty pleas, 5 were referred for federal
prosecution and 1 offender was acquitted by a jury.”99 These results were
generally seen as a resounding success for the tribal communities, particularly
those involved in the program.100 Reporting rates are up, which in the context of
95. The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) is an organization representing the interests of
American Indian and Alaska Natives. Its stated purposes are:
to serve as a forum for unified policy development among tribal governments in order to: (1) protect
and advance tribal governance and treaty rights; (2) promote the economic development and health
and welfare in Indian and Alaska Native communities; and (3) educate the public toward a better
understanding of Indian and Alaska Native tribes.
About NCAI, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-ncai (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
96. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(h).
97. Three other tribes, approved to implement SDVCJ on March 6, 2015, were the Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana and the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse
Reservation in North and South Dakota. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION PILOT PROJECT REPORT 40 (2015), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/NewsArticle_
VutTUSYSfGPRpZQRYzWcuLekuVNeeTAOBBwGyvkWYwPRUJOioqI_SDVCJ%20Pilot%20Project%20
Report_6-7-16_Final.pdf.
98. Id. at 1–2.
99. Id. at 5.
100. See S. 2785, A Bill to Protect Native Children and Promote Public Safety in Indian Country; S. 2916,
A Bill to Provide that the Pueblo of Santa Clara May Lease for 99 Years Certain Restricted Land and for Other
Purposes; and S. 2920, The Tribal Law and Order Reauthorization Act of 2016: Hearing on S. 2785, S. 2916,
and S. 2920 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. 15 (2016) (prepared statement of Tracy Toulou,
Director, Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice) (“The three original Pilot Project tribes achieved
notable success implementing SDVCJ during the Pilot Project period from February 2014 through March
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domestic violence in Indian communities is likely a positive sign—signifying an
increased confidence that perpetrators will be held accountable.101 But Professor
Riley also identified that the pilot tribes already had essentially all of the
procedural requirements in place to implement SDVCJ, such as law-trained
judges and recognition of indigent defendants’ right to counsel.102 Other tribes
without the resources and judicial infrastructure to take advantage of VAWA
2013 simply do not have any reasonable ability to implement these laws on their
own lands.103
To date, eighteen of the 573 federally recognized tribes104 are known to
have implemented SDVCJ, most of which have already begun to prosecute nonIndian perpetrators of domestic violence.105 Those implementing tribes vary in
size, population, diversity, and geographic location. They include widely diverse
populations of non-Indians living on their tribal lands, and are located in the
Northwest Coast, the American Southwest, the Great Plains, and the
Southeast.106 Additionally, fifty total tribes participate in the Inter-Tribal
Technical Assistance Working Group (ITWG), a collaborative group established
by the U.S. Department of Justice to facilitate the sharing of information and
best practices in implementing SDVCJ.107
The 2018 NCAI report on the five-year effects of SDVCJ, the first of its
kind, provides a comprehensive overview of the current status and effectiveness

2015.”); Riley, supra note 12, at 1595 (“By most accounts, TLOA and VAWA stand as enormous victorious for
Indian country.”).
101. Riley, supra note 12, at 1605; cf. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 27 (describing domestic violence
as a historically underreported crime).
102. Riley, supra note 12, at 1606.
103. See id. at 1596 (“For some tribes-particularly—those that do not already have criminal courts in place,
have very small reservation populations to draw from for human capital, or have limited funds with overwhelming social problems requiring their scant resources—implementation may not be feasible or even
desirable.”).
104. Jefferson Keel, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Remarks at the Sixteenth Annual State of Indian
Nations Address (Feb. 12, 2018).
105. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 1, 5 n.iv, 42–60 (“Since the end of the pilot period, tribes are not
required to notify the DOJ if they begin exercising SDVCJ. This report covers the 18 implementing tribes that
have reported implementation to NCAI and its partner technical assistance providers, although it remains a
possibility that there are other tribes implementing SDVCJ.”). Those eighteen implementing tribes are: the
Pascua Yaqui Tribe in Arizona, the Tulalip Tribes in Washington, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation in Oregon, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana, the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation in North and South Dakota, the Little Traverse Bay
Band of Odawa Indians in Michigan, the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, the Choctaw Nation in Oklahoma,
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina, the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma, the Sac and Fox
Nation in Oklahoma, the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi in
Michigan, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Oklahoma, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in North and South
Dakota, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa in Michigan, the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana, and the Lower
Elwha Klallam Tribe in Washington. Id. at 6.
106. Id. at 17–18.
107. Id. at 1; see also NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, POLICY UPDATE 20–21 (2017),
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_zZTmwUgiMOBFwXQKgNIDMPzHsGLyRoEArzrzjCwRJtJz
nxBGJFJ_Annual%20Policy%20Update%202017%20-%20Final%2010.13.pdf.
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of the law.108 The report compiles critical data and stories from all corners of the
SDVCJ-exercising world, with some of the key prosecution numbers as follows:
Of the 143 arrests for SDVCJ-related crimes, 52 percent have resulted in
convictions, while 18 percent have resulted in acquittals or dismissals. Of the
cases that were ultimately filed, 21 percent were dismissed or resulted in
acquittals. Tribes report that the cases are dismissed, or they are unable to
prosecute for a range of reasons including: uncooperative witnesses, insufficient
evidence, determination that the tribe lacks jurisdiction, filing errors, plea deals
on other cases, or detention by another jurisdiction.109

As with most American court systems, the majority of SDVCJ convictions
came through plea bargains, with relatively few jury trials.110 In Summer 2017,
the Pascua Yaqui Tribe became the first to convict a defendant by jury trial
through an exercise of SDVCJ.111 Recognizing the roles non-Indian defendants
may have in tribal communities, the exercising tribes also emphasized batterer
intervention or other tribal rehabilitation programs in their proceedings.112 The
report concluded by recognizing the serious limitations the current law imposes
on tribes implementing SDVCJ, including a bevy of ancillary crimes not
chargeable by the tribe such as child abuse and drug and alcohol crimes.113
Although VAWA 2013 authorized $5 million to be spent on SDVCJ
implementation each fiscal year from 2014 to 2018, “[o]ver the past two years,
OVW has awarded $5,684,939 in competitive grant funds to 14 different tribes
to support their implementation of SDVCJ. Only four implementing tribes—
Tulalip, Little Traverse Bay Band, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and
Standing Rock—have received any of these grant funds.”114 Launching and
exercising SDVCJ is still prohibitively expensive for nearly all tribes.115
In encouraging recent news, it appears the Justice Department has
committed to providing additional funds in fiscal year 2018. By the end of
September 2018, the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) will award
nearly $55 million to tribes and tribal nonprofit organizations through VAWA

108. See generally FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id. at 19.
111. Debra Utacia Krol, Pascua Yaqui Tribe First to Use VAWA to Prosecute Non-Indian, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (June 9, 2017), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/pascua-yaqui-tribe-first-to-use-vawato-prosecute-non-indian-DaUpRysbBkCp7qEnIVXnJQ/.
112. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 20.
113. Id. at 22–26.
114. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted); see also OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (OVW), U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OVW FISCAL YEAR 2017 GRANTS TO TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS TO EXERCISE SPECIAL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/915261/download
(providing an example of a spending program application authorized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1304(f), described
supra Part I).
115. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 29–30.
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programs, which includes a carve-out for the exercise of SDVCJ.116 It remains
to be seen what portion of that funding will go towards SDVCJ implementation.
B. CURRENT CRITICISMS
The academic and popular discourse around SDVCJ is, on the whole, very
positive. By most accounts, the passage of VAWA 2013 was a tremendous
victory for tribal nations nationwide, signifying an incremental step towards
federally supported Indian self-determination.117 Indigenous leaders like Keith
Harper, a former ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Council,
described SDVCJ as placing tribal communities “in a better posture to address
the challenges they face,” while making “safer and ultimately more prosperous
communities.”118 But like all things, SDVCJ is not without its share of skeptics.
This Part addresses some of the major criticisms and concerns regarding SDVCJ.
1. Constitutionality of Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction
SDVCJ has never been challenged in court. As such, the debate
surrounding its constitutionality remains only academic. But that is not to say
such debate is irrelevant. Given the significance of defendants’ procedural rights
in criminal proceedings and the prospect of avoiding criminal punishment on
constitutional grounds, it is only a matter of time before a defendant decides to
challenge SDVCJ. The weight of such a decision and the uncertainties in
relevant constitutional doctrines, discussed in depth below, could very well
prompt the Supreme Court to take up any eventual appeal.
Prominent among critics of SDVCJ is Paul Larkin of the Heritage
Institute,119 who has argued that by enacting VAWA 2013’s SDVCJ provisions,
Congress violated structural constitutional safeguards in Articles II and III of the
United States Constitution.120 Article II provides for the appointment power of
all “Officers of the United States” in the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.121 Larkin’s argument asserts that SDVCJ runs afoul of the
Executive’s Article II appointment power because tribal judges are appointed
according to tribes’ own law and custom and not by the President of the United
116. Acting Associate Attorney General Jesse Panuccio Delivers Keynote Address at 2018 Violence Against
Women Tribal Consultation, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/actingassociate-attorney-general-jesse-panuccio-delivers-keynote-address-2018-violence.
117. See, e.g., Brian Cladoosby, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Remarks at the Twelfth Annual
State of Indian Nations Address (Jan. 30, 2014).
118. Krol, supra note 111 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Keith Harper, Cherokee attorney and
former ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council).
119. Paul Larkin is a Senior Legal Research Fellow at the Heritage Institute, an organization with a mission
to “formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.” About Heritage,
HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/mission (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
120. See Paul Larkin, Jr., Domestic Abuse on Indian Reservations: How Congress Failed to Protect Women
Against Violence, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/civil-rights/report/domesticabuse-indian-reservations-how-congress-failed-protect-women-against#_ftnref13.
121. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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States.122 Since a tribal judge ordering a non-Indian to imprisonment through
SDVCJ is “a classic example of the type of government power that only a person
properly appointed under Article II can exercise,” Congress thereby improperly
‘appoints’ officers of the United States in violation of Article II when it allows
tribes to exercise SDVCJ over non-Indian defendants.123
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts subsequently established by Congress, and
provides life tenure and guaranteed salaries to judges.124 Larkin’s Article III
argument posits that tribal judges ordering non-Indians to imprisonment is a
quintessential exercise of the “Judicial Power” of the United States.125 And since
tribal judges do not enjoy the protections of life tenure and salary assurances,
Larkin argues, any tribal exercise of SDVCJ violates Article III on its face.126
Larkin’s arguments are intriguing, but not quite complete. As Tom Gede,127
former Commissioner of the Indian Law and Order Commission, has suggested,
Larkin’s Article II and III arguments assume SDVCJ involves a delegation of
U.S. criminal jurisdiction to tribes, rather than a tribal exercise of inherent
authority.128 Put another way, if the basis for exercising criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians comes from within tribes’ sovereign authority, Articles II and
III simply would not pose any structural, constitutional bar to tribes prosecuting
non-Indians. Under such a framework, tribal judges prosecuting non-Indians
through SDVCJ would not be “Officers of the United States,” and thus would
not require presidential appointment.129 Further, tribes exercising SDVCJ under
an inherent authority would not be wielding the “Judicial Power” of the United
States—tribes would simply be exercising their own power—and thus tribal
judges would not be subject to life tenure requirements and protection against
salary reduction. This reasoning reflects one of the strongest positions on tribal
authority, one which is consistent with the broadest views of tribal sovereignty
and power.
Recall that Congress described the “Nature of the Criminal Jurisdiction”
(that is, the nature of SDVCJ) as follows: “the powers of self-government of a
participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction over all persons.”130 Taken at face value, this passage leaves no
122. Larkin, supra note 120.
123. Id. Larkin’s article on the Heritage.org website is an abridged version of a full-length article previously
published. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Luppino-Esposito, The Violence Against Women Act, Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 20–24 (2012).
124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
125. Larkin, supra note 120.
126. Id.
127. Thomas F. Gede is of counsel at the firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. He has a distinguished career
serving in numerous capacities in government, academia, and the private sector in the field of American Indian
Law.
128. Laird, supra note 27.
129. See Price, supra note 39, at 700.
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (Supp. I 2013) (emphasis added).
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doubt as to how Congress intended to frame the power behind SDVCJ, which
undermines Larkin’s core assumption of delegation. But it remains to be seen
whether congressional intent is the determinative factor.
Putting aside for a moment the effect of Congress’s intent in the SDVCJ
equation, there lies another, more severe obstacle for those who would propose
an “inherent” basis for tribal jurisdiction under VAWA 2013—the confusion
apparent in the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding inherent tribal power over
the last forty years.131 To start with, any view supporting SDVCJ under the
theory of inherent tribal authority is inconsistent with Oliphant in that the
Supreme Court refused to recognize any inherent power of tribes to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.132 After all, in Oliphant, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned in an argument based on historical and political deference
that “absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress,” there was no
right for a tribe to try a non-Indian in criminal court.133 But Oliphant did not
clarify just what “affirmative [congressional] delegation” meant and to what
extent Congress could exercise such a power.
The Court’s later decisions in Duro v. Reina134 and United States v. Lara135
answer some of these questions, but only muddy the water elsewhere. Duro
followed Oliphant in holding that Indian tribes may not assert criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, reasoning that tribes’ “dependent status”
to the federal government is inconsistent with the right to freely exert authority
over external affairs.136 Congress subsequently passed legislation abrogating the
Court’s holding in Duro (the so-called “Duro fix”), giving criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians back to tribes.137 In the Duro fix, Congress—using
strikingly similar language to the SDVCJ provisions in VAWA 2013—
“recognized and affirmed” the “inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”138 Some ten years later in Lara, the Court
upheld the Duro fix, reasoning that Congress had the power to “rela[x]
restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States
recognizes.”139 The majority supported the holding by reasoning that Congress
simply modified political restrictions placed on tribes’ exercise of inherent
131. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 41, at 297 (“This pattern of doctrinal confusion has become more
predominant in recent times because the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself a judicial version of plenary
power that has muddied the jurisprudential waters of Indian law even further.”).
132. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206–12.
133. Id. at 208; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 221 (2004) (5–4 decision) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Oliphant . . . held that tribes could not enforce their criminal laws against nonIndians.”).
134. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
135. Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
136. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686–88.
137. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (amended 1991); Act of
Oct. 28. 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).
138. Price, supra note 39, at 677 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of
Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (amended 1991)).
139. Lara, 541 U.S. at 207.
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power—restrictions that were not in and of themselves constitutionally based.140
Lastly, and importantly, the majority reasoned that the power recognized to
tribes in the Duro fix was not “delegated” federal authority as contemplated in
Duro and Oliphant; rather, Congress achieved the same end by removing
restrictions on tribal sovereignty.141
Contrary to the ease with which Justice Breyer reasoned through the
majority opinion in Lara, the five-four decision and accompanying concurrences
and dissents leave the Court’s past forty years of federal Indian law
jurisprudence even less settled.142 As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence made clear,
the issue before the Court in Lara—the applicability of the “separate sovereign”
doctrine for defendant’s double jeopardy claim—may have limited the Court’s
full analysis of the constitutional implications of the Duro fix.143 Indeed, Justice
Thomas (also concurring in the judgment) called on the Court to “reexamine the
premises and logic” of the Court’s tribal sovereignty cases.144 Further, the
dissent by Justice Souter, joined by Justice Scalia, simply refused to accept any
other basis for expanded tribal authority aside from a delegation of federal
authority, regardless of how Congress worded the statute.145
The more recent decision in United States v. Bryant146 is also relevant. In
Bryant, the Court considered whether an Indian defendant’s uncounseled
conviction in a tribal court proceeding could serve as a predicate offense for a
U.S. habitual offender statute.147 The Court unanimously held that since the
tribal court conviction complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act, it could be
used as a predicate offense in a U.S. court without violating the defendant’s

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 207.
Price, supra note 39, at 678–79.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 211–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 214 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 227–28 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
Id. at 1962; The Court described the background of the case as follows:

Respondent Bryant’s conduct is illustrative of the domestic violence problem existing in Indian
country. During the period relevant to this case, Bryant, an enrolled member of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe, lived on that Tribe’s reservation in Montana. He has a record of over 100 tribalcourt convictions, including several misdemeanor convictions for domestic assault. Specifically,
between 1997 and 2007, Bryant pleaded guilty on at least five occasions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Court to committing domestic abuse in violation of the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code. On one
occasion, Bryant hit his live-in girlfriend on the head with a beer bottle and attempted to strangle her.
On another, Bryant beat a different girlfriend, kneeing her in the face, breaking her nose, and leaving
her bruised and bloodied.
For most of Bryant’s repeated brutal acts of domestic violence, the Tribal Court sentenced him
to terms of imprisonment, never exceeding one year. When convicted of these offenses, Bryant was
indigent and was not appointed counsel. Because of his short prison terms, Bryant acknowledges, the
prior tribal-court proceedings complied with ICRA, and his convictions were therefore valid when
entered. Bryant has never challenged his tribal-court convictions in federal court under ICRA’s
habeas corpus provision.
Id. at 1963.
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel.148 The Court’s recognition of the severity of
the domestic violence problem in Indian country, albeit in dicta, is
encouraging.149 And the Court’s relatively narrow holding assumed, as Justice
Thomas asserts in his concurring opinion, “that tribes’ retained sovereignty
entitles them to prosecute tribal members in proceedings that are not subject to
the Constitution.”150 But no direct challenge to TLOA (or SDVCJ, for that
matter) was before the Court, so these premises supporting tribal sovereignty
may not be persuasive authority in a future case challenging SDVCJ.
All this is to say that the Court’s more recent Indian law decisions do not
completely clear up the issue surrounding the constitutionality of SDVCJ. In
fact, one of the points relied upon by the Lara majority was the “limited” change
at issue in that case—there, the power to prosecute nonmember Indians.151
Surely the Court would not view the power to prosecute a non-Indian, U.S.
citizen as a “limited” change from tribes’ recognized inherent power to
prosecute their own members—distinguishing SDVCJ from the Duro fix upheld
in Lara. Not least in the considerations is the scope of Congress’s “plenary
power” in Indian affairs and the effect of congressional intent to support
SDVCJ.152 The recent transformation of the makeup of the Supreme Court, with
the additions of Justice Neil Gorsuch and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, further casts
uncertainty over the direction of future federal Indian law. While colorable
arguments can be made on either side of the constitutionality of SDVCJ under
the Court’s current precedent, Indian victims of non-Indian perpetrated domestic
violence need concrete solutions.153
Fortunately, uncertainty in current law is not the end of the analysis.
Professor Zachary Price154 in his article, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and
Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, presents a compelling case for a pragmatic
resolution to the problems encountered in defining the boundaries and sources
of constitutional tribal jurisdiction.155 Professor Price argues that, while the
148. Id. at 1966.
149. See id. at 1963 (noting that the Respondent’s conduct is “illustrative of the domestic violence problem”
in Indian country).
150. Id. at 1967–69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling again for a reexamination of the Court’s Indian law
precedent).
151. Lara, 541 U.S. at 204.
152. For further discussion on the plenary power doctrine and its effect on SDVCJ, see Margaret H. Zhang,
Comment, Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
Versus Defendants’ Complete Constitutional Rights, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 274–76 (2015); cf. Lara, 541 U.S.
at 224–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the constitutional basis for the congressional
Indian plenary power doctrine).
153. For an argument urging the constitutionality of SDVCJ under the majority opinion in Lara, see M.
Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and DOJ’s Proposed Fix, 28 HARV.
J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 117, 171 (2012); cf Larkin, supra note 119 (arguing that section 904 of VAWA,
which grants Indian tribal courts concurrent jurisdiction, is unconstitutional and “should be struck down”).
154. Professor Zachary Price is an Associate Professor at the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, where he specializes in constitutional law, civil procedure, and federal Indian law, among other areas.
155. See generally Price, supra note 39 (proposing a framework based on “divided sovereignty” and the
parallels between tribal, territorial, and related federal-state contexts).
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“inherent” versus “delegated” framework adopted by various courts and scholars
is conceptually appealing, it suffers from fatal doctrinal problems that may
eventually undercut the core goals of tribal sovereignty.156 For instance, in the
context of state-conducted Public Law 280 prosecutions, a consistent application
of case law under the “inherent” authority doctrine might lead such prosecutions
to be “shoehorned into the inherent authority framework by characterizing such
prosecutions as exercises of a reactivated inherent authority of states over their
territory.”157 This has potentially damning consequences to the tribes that gained
so much with the passage of VAWA 2013 by further detracting from the tribal
sovereignty remaining over Indian lands. Further, the same “inherent” versus
“delegated” framework has consistently led the Supreme Court to progressively
curtail what little has remained of tribal sovereignty in the last forty years.158
Professor Price presents his conceptual alternative by “[r]ecognizing the
interplay of federal and local authority at work in tribal . . . criminal
jurisdiction,” and analyzing constitutional issues based on comparisons between
tribal, territorial, and state contexts.159 In his view, normative considerations and
practical realities can lead to a constitutionally permissible interpretive
framework of “divided sovereignty,” where many of the conceptually
problematic aspects of inherent authority disappear.160 Instead of focusing
primarily on the source of power being exercised—that is, whether a power is
inherent in a subordinate government or delegated from the superior
government—the relevant focus shifts to the divisions of power characteristic
within our federal system.161
By adopting Professor Price’s framework, the Article II and III issues
raised by Larkin essentially disappear, recognizing that the crimes of domestic
violence prosecuted by tribes pursuant to SDVCJ are federally conferred, but
realized through the autonomous powers of criminal enforcement in tribal
governments.162 Tribal courts simply enforce and punish local prohibitions
against criminal domestic violence. Such a conclusion has long since been
implicitly acknowledged by a large body of case law.163 This division of
sovereignty between tribes and the federal government places SDVCJ
prosecution in a separate realm from the typical structural restraints present
within the federal government. Since additional practical reasons for federal
156. Id. at 663–64; cf. Zhang, supra note 152, at 263–72 (analyzing SDVCJ’s constitutionality through a
binary application of “inherent” versus “delegated” authority).
157. Price, supra note 39, at 697; see also id. at 692–95.
158. Id. at 697–98.
159. Id. at 698; see also id. at 668.
160. Id. at 698. Professor Price notes his article comes from the perspective of “a federal decisionmaker
bound to apply federal law and to seek coherent solutions within the existing legal system.” Id. at 667.
161. See id. at 699–726.
162. See id. at 698–99. This thesis bears some recognition to the typical inherent/delegated framework but
places the emphasis in a somewhat different place. It instead views the powers of federal and tribal sovereignty
as coexistent and intertwined. In places of shared sovereignty, federal individual rights may well bend to
compelling tribal interests such as regulating pervasive criminal activity.
163. Id.
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control are absent (particularly where defendants’ procedural protections are
mandated, like in VAWA 2013), any remaining argument that a tribal judge
should qualify as an “Officer of the United States” falls apart, and no Article II
appointment issues or Article III life tenure or salary guarantee issues remain.164
This Note further considers this framework in conjunction with SDVCJ
expansion infra Part III.
2. Other Critiques
Professor Riley discusses a paradox at the very core of SDVCJ. She
elevates the concern that “Indian tribes may only be able to guarantee their
sovereign rights to exercise criminal jurisdiction if they do so on the terms of
the very government that has, for so long, sought to dismantle tribal justice
systems.”165 She refers to this as the “double blind” of the tribal sovereignty
SDVCJ embodies.166 In a sense, tribes are left with the choice of using penal
methods that likely do not conform to their history and traditions, or watching
their people suffer because they have no effective authority without imitating an
American criminal justice system.167 While the tribes that have implemented
SDVCJ appear to be operating under a familiar American-like adversarial
system, tribes and tribal leaders have repeatedly expressed the desire to use
alternatives to detention when feasible.168 Such alternative approaches are
decidedly more consistent with tribal law and custom.169
Tribes have historically expressed skepticism around various procedural features
of the American criminal justice system. Throughout Indian country, disputes are
resolved in justice systems of many varieties, some of which may significantly
deviate from American-style courts. Tribes may resolve disputes through
informal mechanisms, such as families, clans, talking circles, or elder councils.
Tribal leaders have in the past opposed the idea of jury trials, the encouragement
of defendants not to speak as to their own guilt or innocence, and an impartial
judge with no knowledge of the case, among others. Tribes may, therefore, elect
to integrate traditional practices at all stages of the criminal justice process.170

For example, systems like those of the Yurok Tribe in Northern California
have seen strong signs of success in rehabilitating batterers in recent years.171
Judge Abby Abinanti, Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribal Court, has placed an
emphasis on developing methods that align with tribal custom prior to Western
interruption, incorporating the elder system to intervene and prevent future

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 699–703.
Riley, supra note 12, at 1595.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1624–25.
See id.
Id. at 1627 (footnotes omitted).
Rebecca Clarren, Judge Abby Abinanti Is Fighting for Her Tribe—and for a Better Justice System,
NATION (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/judge-abby-abinanti-is-fighting-for-her-tribe-andfor-a-better-justice-system/.
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violence.172 In many ways, tribes are in a unique position to implement effective
alternatives to incarceration that are tailored to the needs of a much smaller
population than most American jurisdictions oversee.173
Once again, in order to exercise SDVCJ, a tribe must provide defendants
with additional procedural protections and Western judicial infrastructure that
are not otherwise mandatory. As these examples have demonstrated, doing so is
often directly contrary to tribal tradition and custom.174 The more ideal goal,
according to Professor Riley, is to seek a cultural match between tribal values
and contemporary governance.175 Professor Riley ultimately concludes that
adoption of SDVCJ, when appropriate and fiscally possible, presents “an
opportunity for tribal governments to exercise, enhance, and enrich tribal
sovereignty.”176
Other commentators have pushed the view that, despite VAWA 2013’s
success, SDVCJ does not go nearly far enough. Some push for an expansion of
tribal jurisdiction over collateral crimes to domestic violence.177 Others push for
more expansive jurisdiction into crimes such as acquaintance rape, stranger rape,
and all child sexual crimes—crimes which are not covered by SDVCJ.178 Several
recent developments in the 115th Congress show significant promise on these
fronts.179
Senate Bill 1986, titled Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence,
would amend the SDVCJ section of Indian Civil Rights Act (added in VAWA
2013) to also include tribal jurisdiction over crimes of sexual violence, sex
trafficking, and stalking.180 This provision relies on the same constitutional
framework as the Duro fix and SDVCJ, affirming “inherent” tribal authority to
exercise jurisdiction over such acts.181 Another bill, Savanna’s Act, directs the
United States Attorney General to address and coordinate solutions in response
to the epidemic of missing and murdered indigenous women.182 Two other bills
would aid funding gaps in Indian country both to survivors of violence and tribal
law enforcement services.183 One of the most recent bills, the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2018, combines many of these elements and may

172. Id.
173. See id. (“The tribe has yet to analyze its recidivism rates overall, but a handful of studies indicate that
other tribal courts are achieving better success for their members than are state courts.”).
174. Riley, supra note 12, at 1599.
175. Id. at 1628.
176. Id. at 1574.
177. Quilt et al., supra note 29.
178. See, e.g., DEER, supra note 71, at 105–06.
179. See Lillian Alvernaz, Still Not Enough, MS. JD BLOG (Feb. 15, 2018), https://msjd.org/blog/article/still-not-enough.
180. Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence Act, S. 1986, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
181. See id.
182. Savanna’s Act, S. 1942, 115th Cong. §§ 1–2 (2017); Savanna’s Act, H.R. 4485, 115th Cong. (2017).
183. See SURVIVE Act, S. 1870, 115th Cong. (2017); Tribal Law and Order Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2017, 115th Cong. (2017).
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well form the basis for the eventual legislation.184 The new legislation may
transform SDVCJ to the new “special tribal criminal jurisdiction,” which covers
the areas mentioned above along with crimes of child abuse.185 Regarding the
fate of these bills, any challenge to the constitutionality of SDVCJ will have
critical implications for the bills’ potential passage, as the constitutional
authority for criminal jurisdiction in each bill is shared with VAWA 2013.
III. PATHS FORWARD
This Part attempts to offer a solution focused on how SDVCJ can be
improved to best serve Native American victims of domestic violence that occur
on tribal lands. Effective law enforcement and penal authority on tribal
communities would serve the dual functions of holding offenders accountable
and garnering confidence of tribal communities in their power to respond to
domestic violence. Domestic violence continues to be an issue of epidemic
proportions despite the enactment of VAWA 2013. Domestic violence still
occurs at an unacceptably high rate in Indian communities—five times more
often than in white communities—and far too often by non-Indian
perpetrators.186
Drawing from the lessons learned through a close examination of the
history, implementation, and early successes of SDVCJ, this Part advocates for
a legislative expansion tailored to those tribes that cannot feasibly implement
the requirements needed to exercise SDVCJ.187 Defendants’ rights must be
protected, but tribal governments should not be powerless to protect their people
when the federal government will not act effectively. The safety and well-being
of indigenous women depends on a viable solution.
A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: AN “SDVCJ FIX”
In the five years since the passage of VAWA 2013, only eighteen known
tribes have been able to implement SDVCJ.188 Indeed, one of the primary
reasons, if not the primary reason, why SDVCJ has not been more broadly
implemented is the lack of resources of prospective tribes.189 The Pascua Yaqui
Tribe described some of the concerns that face tribes looking to employ SDVCJ
as follows:
In addition to the direct costs of complying with the prerequisites (indigent
defender systems, jury trials, incarceration, etc.), substantial indirect costs are
184. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2018, H.R. 6545, 115th Cong. § 906 (2018).
185. Id. § 906.
186. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 3.
187. Tribes that can feasibly implement the jurisdiction as laid out in VAWA 2013 should still be able to
where desirable in the tribe’s own circumstances. In some cases, tribes may wish to adopt this new proposed
format regardless of financial considerations. Given the jurisdictional arguments advanced herein, tribes should
be able to determine for themselves which type of jurisdiction is most beneficial, the basis for tribal sovereignty
being the same in either circumstance.
188. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
189. Id. at 29.
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also likely to be required. For example, who will review and propose changes to
your laws and procedures? Who will train law enforcement, prosecutors, judges,
court staff and defense counsel on the new laws and procedures and how they
work? What funding will be required to make these changes? To pay for any
additional prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, and court staff? To pay to publish
the laws and regulations? To process the licensing and educational requirements?
To implement the jury selection process? To pay for incarceration? Where will
these funds come from? Is that source of funding stable and reliable? 190

By passing VAWA 2013 and failing to appropriate the funds necessary to
allow it to be effective in Indian country over the first years of the program,
Congress has effectively acknowledged the problem in Indian country and
walked away without committing to solve it. It is time to take an alternate path
that can work for all victims of inter-racial tribal domestic violence.
As a starting point, scholars and practitioners have advocated for
encouraging alternatives to incarceration outside SDVCJ, which are consistent
with many tribal traditions and cultures.191 Such dispute resolution procedures
have firm roots in many tribes’ history. When practical, as Professor Riley has
noted, employing such procedures can have a positive effect for tribal
sovereignty and determination, as well as on survivors and offenders.192 On
another important note, many of the additional procedural burdens imposed by
tribes exercising SDVCJ are only operative when a period of imprisonment is
contemplated.193 If a tribe “exercises” SDVCJ without imposing imprisonment
on a defendant, the tribe need only provide the right to a jury trial and the right
to “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the
United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power
of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction over the defendant.”194 Of course, it is not a stretch to imagine a lack
of meaningful incentive for offenders to participate when absolutely no period
of imprisonment—even detention—is possible unless the tribe complies with
the procedural requirements of SDVCJ. While traditional tribal dispute methods
can provide meaningful solutions in many cases, in the context of domestic
violence they may not be as effective. Victims simply would not be afforded the
necessary protection and safety they need when tribal governments do not have
concrete legal justification to detain abusers in emergency situations. This is the
place where an expanded tribal authority can meet a need. I propose the
following solution, an “SDVCJ fix.”
As a viable SDVCJ fix, this Note proposes an amendment to VAWA and
TLOA that would dramatically increase the number of tribes eligible to exercise
190. Id. (quoting ALFRED URBINA & MELISSA TATUM, CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING VAWA’S
SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND TLOA’S ENHANCED SENTENCING AUTHORITY: A
LOOK AT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PASCUA TRIBE 41 (2014)).
191. See Riley, supra note 12, at 1620–22; ROADMAP, supra note 79, at 129.
192. See Riley, supra note 12, at 1625 n.308.
193. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (Supp. I 2013) (referencing procedural rights required by TLOA for terms of
imprisonment longer than one year).
194. See id.
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SDVCJ. Specifically, Congress should amend VAWA 2013 to allow tribes to
criminally prosecute and imprison non-Indian defendants who commit crimes of
domestic violence against tribal members, have sufficient ties to the victim, and
do not successfully complete tribal programs offered to the defendant as an
alternative to incarceration. This power would be afforded to all tribes, not
simply those with the means to implement a Western court system. Such
authority would include the power for tribal law enforcement to intervene at the
point of conflict and detain defendants for a time commensurate with the crime
they are suspected of committing. Any subsequent period of a defendant’s
imprisonment would not be subject to the same procedural requirements of
SDVCJ, but instead would be determined by balancing the interests of tribes and
defendants.
This proposal takes the current Congress as it has appeared through much
of the 2010s—gridlocked, partisan, and eager to save resources. Thus, it assumes
that Congress will not change the law to eliminate the prohibitively expensive
procedural requirements of TLOA and VAWA 2013. It also assumes that
Congress will not meaningfully fund the 573 federally recognized tribes who
have not been able to implement SDVCJ to bring themselves into compliance
with the procedural requirements of exercising the law.
While wider sweeping proposals might more effectively fix the SDVCJ
problem, this Note offers a more nuanced solution. It attempts to strike a balance
between the politically possible and the idealistic, all while striving to offer a
viable solution to the victims who have not been afforded protection under
SDVCJ. This proposal also attempts to strike a balance between protecting
victims from abuse and protecting non-Indian defendants’ rights. By potentially
offsetting or delaying any period of imprisonment (aside from intervention in
the act of a crime), defendants’ interests in procedural protections may well be
reduced in initial proceedings under this framework.
Professor Price’s “divided sovereignty” approach, as previously discussed,
attempted to propose an adequate and supportable doctrinal framework for
addressing constitutional issues in tribal sovereignty. This Note proposes
adopting that framework and uses it as a justification for this proposed SDVCJ
fix.195 This framework simultaneously clears a quagmire of constitutional
reasoning and provides support for this Note’s proposed SDVCJ fix. Professor

195. Before moving on, it is worth recalling the “inherent” versus “delegated” approach to tribal
sovereignty. Under a pure version of that framework, there would be no procedural requirements for tribes
exercising an undiluted “inherent” criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, absent congressional mandate of tribes
under the ‘plenary power’ doctrine. While such a reading would certainly make the SDVCJ fix analysis simple,
there simply is no guarantee that the current Supreme Court would uphold SDVCJ under that framework. But
on the other hand, an adoption of that doctrine with an assumption of “delegated” tribal authority would be
devastating to tribal sovereignty and those who seek to remedy the epidemic of domestic violence on tribal lands.
From a “delegated” standpoint, there could be absolutely no exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction without a full
accompaniment of procedural and structural rights, rendering both SDVCJ and this Note’s proposed SDVCJ fix
dead in the water.
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Price’s framework196 drew from analogous circumstances of federal-state
relations.197 There, he found support in a balancing framework to determine
which guarantees of the U.S. Constitution apply in a given circumstance.198 To
the extent a court would accept such a balancing framework, the “autonomy
interests of the tribe might support allowing prosecution in accordance with
traditional procedures of the particular prosecuting tribe, but only insofar as the
accommodation of the tribe’s procedural tradition does not unduly burden the
individual interests underlying an asserted procedural right.”199 It is in this area
that the critical last step—imprisonment—of the proposed SDVCJ fix would
find itself.
To be clear, Congress would be making a significant exception to the
Indian Civil Rights Act by eliminating certain tribal defendants’ procedural
rights under the scenario envisioned in this proposed SDVCJ fix. Under current
precedent, Congress has the nearly universally accepted right to legislate
limitations on tribal sovereignty such as requiring process in tribal courts.200 But
under this Note’s proposal, defendants could only be deprived of constitutional
due process with compelling justification by any tribe exercising the proposed
SDVCJ fix. And, as tribes have routinely demonstrated throughout the first five
years of SDVCJ implementation, fairness is, and has always been, the goal of
tribal adjudication.201 The proceedings of different tribes will certainly vary in
the degree to which they resemble Western adjudication, but through an
application of tribal customary norms, tribes can simultaneously exercise and
realize sovereignty and reach more tribally appropriate results.202 The example
set by Judge Abby Abinanti of the Yurok Tribal Court could become the norm
in exercising this new jurisdiction: issuing a restraining order as an initial matter
and moving immediately to offer a batterer entry into a tribally run rehabilitation
program.203 In such an example, should the batterer fail to complete the program
and recidivate, the tribal court would have the power to imprison the defendant
under its natural proceedings with only those facets of due process absent that
the tribe could not provide. These proceedings would likely take a wide range
of forms, the diversity of tribal values and custom being so diverse across the
nation.204 Skeptics of this proposal should recognize that, as in Western courts,
truth-finding is a paramount concern across tribal courts.205 The same holds true
196. For the full analysis of the divided sovereignty doctrine, see Price, supra note 39.
197. Id. at 709–10.
198. Id. at 723.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 722.
201. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 18–21.
202. See April L. Wilkinson, A Framework for Understanding Tribal Courts and the Application of
Fundamental Law: Through the Voices of Scholars in the Field of Tribal Justice, 15 TRIBAL L.J. 67, 67–68
(2015).
203. See Clarren, supra note 171.
204. Wilkinson, supra note 202, at 82.
205. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the
Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 62 (1988).
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for reconciliation and healing, which perhaps receives greater focus in tribal
courts than in our Western courts.206
Uncertainties will undoubtedly arise under an early implementation of such
a plan, but it is encouraging to note that the ITWG is already in place and would
be the go-to source for collaboration in an early implementation of such a
plan.207 The federal government could provide funding for attorneys to aid in
early interpretive issues surrounding procedural issues in the new law with
relatively little expense.
The proposed SDVCJ fix would also encourage tribe-specific interventions
and conflict resolution strategies, made more effective by the threat of
imprisonment in the event of non-compliance with such programs. The last
critical component would allow tribal police to intervene at the point of the crime
and detain defendants, rather than only being able to remove defendants from
reservations as in current non-SDVCJ implementing tribes.208 This is a critical
step in preventing further victimization. Before any determination of guilt has
been made, tribal courts could issue orders of protection to aid in the
peacekeeping process before the adjudicative proceeding, as in the current
SDVCJ framework.
This Part has attempted to lay out a constitutionally permissible solution to
the problem facing the hundreds of tribes who cannot feasibly implement the
requirements to prosecute non-Indian offenders who commit crimes of domestic
violence on their tribal lands. If adopted, this would enable a significantly higher
number of tribes to protect their own and retake some of the sovereignty lost
under Oliphant.
CONCLUSION
The crisis in Indian country has gone on for far too long, abetted by the
United States’ failure to sufficiently address the issue it recognized in passing
VAWA 2013. Domestic violence has continued to be a problem, rising to
epidemic proportions before VAWA 2013 and continuing at unacceptably high
rates. While the Act heralded significant progress, it does not go far enough. If
we continue at the current rate, there simply is not another option besides
extraordinary spending increases, which seem unlikely to happen. The tribes
need funding, not just to implement the laws, but to police non-Indian crimes,
report the incidents, and ensure their people are properly protected and cared for
when they are harmed. The United States now has a choice: either dramatically
increase funding to tribes under SDVCJ or lighten the procedural process tribes
must provide non-Indian defendants accused of crimes of domestic violence.

206. See Riley, supra note 12, at 1624–28.
207. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 1–2.
208. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (Supp. I 2013); Kevin Abourezk, Tribes Confront Unique Problems in Battle
Against Domestic Violence, INDIANZ (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/04/10/tribesconfront-unique-problems-in-battl.asp.
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One of the foundational principles of federal-Indian law jurisprudence is
the “trust relationship” the U.S. government owes to Indian peoples.209 The stark
reality of domestic violence and jurisdiction in Indian country demands that the
United States adapt to uphold its end of the bargain. As argued in this Note,
victims do not have the luxury to be held at the mercy of a federal government
who cannot or will not adequately protect their well-being. As an alternative to
the current trajectory, this Note proposes a path to increased tribal authority for
those tribes that do not have the means to implement the judicial infrastructure
required to prosecute non-Indians via SDVCJ. This proposed “SDVCJ fix” has
the potential to simultaneously increase exhibition of tribal sovereignty,
provided Congress acts to release some of the restrictions on procedure in
limited circumstances. But more importantly, an SDVCJ fix would provide a
respite for tribal victims of domestic violence who for too long have suffered at
the hands of batterers enabled by the laws of the United States. Working together
is the ultimate solution. It is time the United States acted on its trust
responsibility and allow tribes the means to adequately protect women.

209. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 37, at 71–72; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2
(1831).
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